Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate
A New Article by Adam Nelson
posted by Jon Cruz on April 2nd, 2008
SAN JOSE, Cali. — A new article by Adam Nelson — director of Lincoln-Douglas debate at the Harker School and a member of the faculty at this summer’s Victory Briefs Institute — was just published in the latest issue of the Rostrum, the official magazine of the National Forensic League. The article is called “Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate.” Here’s your chance to reflect on the article online, right here on VBD.
Read. Discuss!
Popularity: 5%
no more tag found, sorry
25 Responses to “Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate”
Leave a Reply
Most Popular Posts
- Bronx Science Closes Out Second-Year Nationals; Larry Liu is Novice National Champion
- "Pre-standards" Arguments
- Field Report: TOC
- Sana Raoof Named New York State Champion
- Jared Dummitt is Northeast Champion
- Clinton Challenges Obama to...a Lincoln-Douglas Debate?
- Truth, Comparison, and Justification in LD Debate
- J.W. Patterson Releases Final Fields for the TOC
- Bilal Malik is California State Champion
- TOC Final Panel Named
Posted from: 76.17.236.195
April 2nd, 2008 12:18
First off - Adam has written an excellent article here, and I hope his call for dialogue will be fruitful both on these pages (as it seems to be already) and elsewhere in the community.
I agree with Adam on a number of things in the article (I feel like I’m writing sentences for the end of an Ask Cruz installment). A few thoughts:
On the question of what should motivate our approach to LD: It’s easy to overlook the significance of Adam’s point in the introduction, which is that debate offers a unique educational vehicle for teaching rigorous and critical thinking. This carves out what I think is a compelling middle ground. A more conservative model of LD tends to emphasize the role of persuasive communication, intuitive appeal of arguments, etc. That we have other events which teach those things and the fact that focusing on them too much undermines our ability to teach rigorous thinking is an important point. But it also cuts against another unfortunate set of arguments which crop up from time to time, and go something like this: we can’t agree on what is educational and who is anyone to say what other people should debate like, anyway? I find that line of argument problematic on a number of levels, but I am most troubled when it is used as an excuse to avoid intellectual integrity. Strategy and technique are all too often used as a vehicle to advance unsubstantive arguments or to avoid engaging with positions in a substantive way. Of course they can be used for exactly the opposite purposes; often good strategy and technique can be used to combat the unsubstantive variety. But my point is that making our choices as coaches and competitors with the value of rigorous and critical thinking in mind (and not simply competitive success) avoids both making the activity so insular and unsubstantive that it loses its primary utility (which in turn makes it more difficult to defend as a worthwhile activity for schools to expend resources on), and at the same time answers those who would advocate for less substantive debate by way of a “persuasiveness” model or something like that.
On the role of the resolution: I’m sympathetic to the the notion that the arbitrary exclusion of offensive arguments via unnuanced standards debate is a problem. I’d be hesitant, though, to justify that concern on the basis that it is inconsistent with what kinds of normative evaluations appeal to our “intuitions” or to the way moral arguments happen “in the real world.” The former is an explicit appeal to intuition and the latter is an is/ought fallacy. If our objective is to shape the activity so as to advance the educational goal of rigorous thinking, it doesn’t seem that these are sound reasons for advocating a particular approach to the role of the resolution nor for denying students access to particular types of arguments (I’m thinking of some of the types of critical positions Adam mentions).
I think a fairer objection is that (to use Adam’s example) both deontological and teleological impacts (or whatever) ARE relevant, not just because we have a sense that they are but because of arguments X, Y, and Z, and so here is how standards should interact. In other words, I think that just better standards debate addresses the issue. We shouldn’t be totally unwilling, though, to think that it may be the case that a standard is logically flawed, that simple take-outs to it are correct, and in those circumstances it may be perfectly justified to disregard impacts to that standard. The issue is that we just have to have better debate on the standard to know which is which. To use an extreme example, if I am invoking a standard of racial purity or something, the most substantive approach is probably to say that racial purity is not a valid standard for Justice (or whatever the normative component of the resolution happens to be). In those cases I don’t feel the need to balance the interests of racial purity with a competing better standard. Of course most cases won’t be that obvious, and many times the best answer probably will be that the considerations should be balanced in some sense. The trouble is that we have to let the standards debate happen or else we devolve into a sort of assumed (and unjustified) CBA without ever having to establish the underlying normative justification for such an evaluation.
Side Note - I don’t mean to defend the value/criterion model per se. In many (maybe most) cases it is more cumbersome than valuable. But to make normative claims we need standards debate of some kind, and it is improved debating on that level that I am advocating as an alternative to changing the way the resolution functions. I’m worried that forcing debaters to talk about the “impacts” of critical arguments other than that they effect the validity of the truth claim forces us into an assumed normative standard that looks a lot like a basic CBA but is not fleshed out or explicitly justified.
On truth claims v. worldviews: This is a tough distinction to maintain. Even on the worldviews model debaters are asked to advance truth claims and their opponents to undermine them. I’m not sure what students shouldn’t have access to whatever arguments undermine those truth claims. We are put in the uncomfortable position again of making prima facie judgments as to the acceptability of arguments regardless of whether they are intellectually rigorous or whether opponents have any answers to them. Again my sense is that we should avoid excluding arguments from the round before it even happens, and instead employ two checks: a)Debaters can just answer the positions, and b)Debaters and coaches making choices about whether the critical position is intellectually rigorous. If the positions are unrigorous students should be able to rebut them on the merits, and if they are unfair they should be able to answer with theory. My sense is that the former is much more often the case than the latter, but like Adam I’m not opposed to the use of theory, so long as its more than simply a tactic to win.
As a side note - even assuming that the worldviews v. truth-claims dichotomy can be maintained, I’m not sure its true that the truth claims model is inconsistent with parallel burdens. It’s true that as a general rule we are skeptical of truth claims prima facie, but there is no reason that skepticism has to be adopted as a judging model. We can simply say the affirmative debater has to prove the resolution true and the negative debater has to prove the resolution false. That will of course frequently put us in positions to intervene, but that happens regardless. I think there are lots of ways to go about intervening - my own preference is to do as little work as possible (buy an underdeveloped argument or something as opposed to say making a whole new argument for a debater), and if worse comes to worse you can just pick a skill you want to reward or something. Those are just as arbitrary as some presumption standard, I suppose, but my point is that an equal burdens structure is perfectly plausible within the truth-claim model.
I ramble, but just a few thoughts to get the dialogue going.
Posted from: 71.236.67.195
April 2nd, 2008 12:30
i essentially wrote the same thing over a year ago - adam and i only differ in our views about presumption. since theldboards have been taken down completely (why wasnt locking the threads good enough? why havent they come back? why were they replaced with a forum on vbd? these questions and more will be answered… indignantly, if at all.), an extended discussion of the exact same issues has been lost to the sands of time. my original article is available here: http://www.pitt.edu/~jmm157/value-comparison.doc
i would be happy to collaborate with adam or anyone else on any future writings about the value comparison paradigm.
Posted from: 68.227.29.120
April 2nd, 2008 19:41
First things first: I want to again thank Michael Mangus for all his work in originally articulating and defending the underlying premise of the article: that we should treat LD resolutions as fundamentally comparative, rather than as truth-statements. As I noted in the text of the article, his writings were the basis of many of the arguments therein. It is my hope that the article posits some additional justifications for that premise, while at the same time articulating and defending what I think are the implications of value-comparison, which sometimes differ from Michael’s original conclusions. I hope that, by rekindling the discussion regarding those ideas, we can start to develop the theoretical rigor that Michael and I agree is currently lacking from LD.
On to Adam (Torson)’s post: I think Adam misunderstands some of the arguments made in the article. I don’t defend “denying students access to” any arguments. My position is simply that we should change the way students make those arguments: instead of simply appealing to the “truth” of claims, students should be prepared to debate the desirability of making those claims. That means students can still negate with “justice does not exist,” as long as they can justify why pretending justice does exist is worse than whatever benefits accrue from affirming.
But that doesn’t mean I’m advocating some “basic [cost-benefit analysis that] is not fleshed out or explicitly justified.” Instead, I’m arguing simply that debaters need to be comparative when making arguments. It is up to them to do the weighing, to “flesh out” just what it means for one worldview to be more desirable than another. That approach need not be purely teleological: debaters could make deontological claims simply by making the argument inherent to all such impacts, that the deontological harm outweighs all other considerations.
Adam says better standards debating would solve, but my argument is that standards are fundamentally counterproductive at producing the kind of standards debating he would like to see. If debaters could not rely on the decontextualized standards debate that exists now, they would be forced to substantively, and comparatively, engage each impact on the flow. The result may be the same: a deontological harm outweighs all others, so the negative wins. But a) that’s unlikely given the kinds of debates that would have to occur (i.e. If the affirmative impact is that affirming solves for extinction, while the negative impact is that affirming treats some people as means to an end, it’s not going to be very persuasive for the negative to argue their impact outweighs extinction. Yet, that would be the result of the negative winning the standards debate, given our current understanding, and implementation of, the standard.) and b) even if the result is the same, the way debaters get there would be different, and more intellectually rigorous, thereby increasing the educational benefits of the activity.
I don’t think the truth-claims v. worldviews distinction is difficult to maintain. Yes, worldviews still deal with truth-claims about desirability. But those are explicitly comparative claims, which allows the model to capture the net-benefits I describe in the article. And, again, the worldviews model does not exclude any arguments; it simply requires all arguments to have an impact. A debate that fails to give such an impact would not have that argument excluded. Instead, that argument would simply be easily outweighed by their opponent. For example, “Justice does not exist” does not negate the Jan/Feb resolution because the impact is terminally non-unique (Justice does not exist in either world), not because the argument is excluded on-face.
Finally, while I suppose the type of truth-statement model Adam describes would be better than the status quo, that’s not how that model is employed now. So, when I indict the truth-claims model, it’s the way we use that model right now that I’m criticizing. Regardless, I think giving the negative the burden of proving the resolution false puts us in an awkward position when neither the affirmative proves the resolution true nor the negative the resolution false. While any paradigm requires some measure of intervention given such circumstances, I’d rather default to the status quo, which, I would argue, is the logical consequence of value-comparison, than the alternatives under a truth-statement model. Status quo presumption is more predictable than other kinds of intervention, yet it’s also more flexible than negative presumption (Debaters can have some control over whether they defend the status quo. Debaters have no control over whether they affirm or negate.)
Still, I’d like to thank Adam for getting this conversation started. Hopefully the dialogue can continue for some time to come!
Posted from: 74.67.55.150
April 2nd, 2008 20:18
A problem I have with this approach is that I think it more inherently lends itself to intervention and judge bias. When one asks themselves has aff proved statement X, it is one which they can absolutely answer without personal bias, either they did or they did not, however to me the statement “On the balance what the aff is advocating is more desirable than what the neg is advocating” is a much more tricky question to answer, especially considering the fact that people tend to have deep set believes already about issues.
I am not saying that judges are going to start disregarding arguments on the flow, or they’re going to start making extensions for debaters, but rather than I feel judges will have a hard time not giving positions they agree with more weight than positions they disagree with, even if it’s on a sub-concious level.
Posted from: 72.73.178.111
April 2nd, 2008 20:19
Adam (and Michael),
Thank you so much for taking the time to write this–I find these kind of articles to be immensely educational, and yours makes an excellent point. I’ll try to post a response with actual content after I get some sleep.
Posted from: 69.150.37.46
April 2nd, 2008 20:21
“a judge may at some point be faced with a round that is tied in every sense of the word, from the substance of the argumentation to the quality of delivery.”
In 9 years and probably 700-1000 rounds, I have never ever seen a round that was “tied in every sense of the word”. Is that just me?
Posted from: 128.54.165.135
April 2nd, 2008 21:10
It;s not about anyone changing their paradigm or interveging in rounds. Rather, its a change in the norms of the community as to what seems to be a reasonable basis for evaluating rounds. The whole point is to actually impact back to the value the whole time. Even in policy resolutions there is an implied value and criterion (net benefits for parli or societal welfare for LD) and the K typically questions that value assumption. So we cna still use the truth model of the resolution, it just has to impact back to the value and set a framework for its evaluation…
Oh, i agree with Mangus on the presumption issue. If we adopt this framework for community norms in evaluating rounds then the disparity between aff and neg rounds will cease. Plus, I think that an affirmative has the greater potential to win a round if they utilize the 2AR to oonfine the issues to what htey need to talk about. Regardless of that, aff presumption just makes logical sense. So not only would the affirmative be more likely to win rounds under the new framework, it would allow the affirmative to better utilize what htey already have and it would add to the coherence of the truth functional view.
Posted from: 24.4.205.201
April 2nd, 2008 22:06
First of all, thanks to Adam (and, by extension, Michael and Ryan) for their work. I’m already on record as saying that I greatly prefer such a comparative approach to the truth-seeking model (see my judging paradigm, for instance).
That said, I greatly disagree with the model of presumption offered here, for one simple reason: even assuming that a debate round could be fully tied, how does introducing another subject to debate solve this issue?
Adam’s article suggests that if debate over which side is more SQ is tied, I should just intervene. Debate on this issue will only be useful, therefore, if it is less likely to be “tied” than any other. I see no reason to believe, however, that this is the case. In other words, this discussion of the status quo seems unlikely to reduce the probability that intervention will be necessary. At that point, unless you argue that such discussion serves an educational purpose (an argument Adam does not make), why introduce it to the round?
My alternative is a purely technical model of minimalist intervention (note: this may be the position Ryan Lawrence advanced in his article on theldboards; without access to the article, I can’t really say. If it is, I probably got the idea from him, so assign credit/blame accordingly.). That is: figure out what intervention would be needed to vote for the affirmative, and what intervention would be necessary to vote for the negative. Vote in the manner which requires less intervention.
Such a model of resolving ties seems to, by its very formulation, significantly reduce the level of intervention necessary. Assuming we agree that intervention is contrary to the objectives of debate that Adam outlines, therefore, it seems like a better solution to the problem of presumption he outlines.
Posted from: 68.209.198.15
April 2nd, 2008 22:47
How do we weigh impacts directly without some sort of standards analysis? Minimally, it seems that the impact framework would have to be specified as deontological or utilitarian, or some variant of either. I don’t understand how we can directly weigh deontological vs. utilitarian impacts, because any weighing presumes one of those moral theories, i.e. “my impact outweighs your deontological impact, because your impact is not net beneficial.”
Posted from: 216.9.250.39
April 3rd, 2008 06:00
Let me see if I can get my BlackBerry to let me post…
Shea: How is that unique? How can judges who will be biased about desirability be unbiased about truth? Judges have biases. Those biases influence their decisions. But I don’t think either model is more susceptible to that kind of intervention.
Sam: I’m sure it’s not just you. I have seen a couple rounds like that, though, so I thought it would be important to articulate what I think we should do in those circumstances.
Ankur: I suppose I should have made this argument clearer in the article: I advocate having the in-round discussion of presumption for precisely that reason. Namely, in a world in which debate is designed to teach strategic and critical thinking skills, adding a discussion of presumption to the debate has the educational benefit of icreasing the complexity of the strategic considestions debaters must evaluate. Moreover, as I articulated in my response to Adam, I think status-quo presumption requires significantly less intervention because it is the natural consequence of the paradigm. To ensure predictability, judges should note in their paradigms which side is more likely to represent the status-quo. That way, predictability can be preserved even if the presumption debate doesn’t happen in round.
Wade: I don’t think so. That debate would have to be resolved, but I don’t think a debater would have to specify that at the beginning of their case. An NC, for example, could very easily have both kinds of impacts, giving her strategic flexibility in deciding which to go for. The kind of weighing done between the two kinds of impacts would have to be more comlex and nuanced, sure, but I think that’s a good thing. So, even if the debate ends up in the same place, the route taken to get there still would have been more educational. Policy debaters have been weighing impacts in this way forever. I’m sure LDers could likewise pick up those skills.
I’m on vacation right now, so I apologize in advance for any delays in my replies. I’ll do my best to post them as soon as I can.
Posted from: 150.212.4.69
April 3rd, 2008 10:06
wade,
we seem to be able to deal w/ that problem reasonably well now - you have impact framework debates. the only differences are that (1) theres not the bizarre “value/criterion” distinction and (2) you only use it when necessary rather than reading it preemptively.
Posted from: 76.17.236.195
April 3rd, 2008 11:16
It seems I jumped too hard on the “denying access to arguments” thing - fair enough. The answer to both that and the notion that better standards debate solves is that we need to be able to contextualize impacts to avoid the arbitrary exclusion of weighty arguments. The nub of the issue then seems to be what Wade is getting at, and was the source of my concern that we will devolve into an assumed but underdeveloped CBA.
In order to examine the relative weight of impacts we need standards analysis. To contextualize impacts in a situation where the standards rely on fundamentally different assumptions (deontological versus teleological conceptions of justice, for example), we would require a normative paradigm to establish the relative importance of each standard - a sort of standard for the standards. That has to devolve into infinite regress. At some point to compare impact structures we have to have a weighing standard that is not contextual. This is a basic philosophical problem - any appeal to objectivity/transcendance/universality seems inherently problematic and almost always begs the question.
So what happens if we say all arguments need to be contextual - we need to say, for example, why it’s preferable to say something like “justice doesn’t exist.” We are forced to appeal to a standard of preferability and problem starts. In the alternative, we have an appeal to some sort of costs and benefits standard that is assumed prior to the round - that is the underdeveloped CBA I’m worried about. We either develop the impact framework debate and get infinite regress (and ultimately the same problem that non-contextualized standards have) or we don’t develop it and get a less substantial assumed costs/benefits calculus.
The alternative, I suppose, is to employ some conception of truth that doesn’t rely on an appeal to transcendance - some kind of intersubjective model. I’m not sure what exactly that would look like, but I’d be very worried that it would become little more than an appeal to “real world” intuitions.
Anyway, all of the above is why I say that better standards debate solves. Though we may never be able to provide an ultimately satisfying normative paradigm under which to evaluate the round (it will always be non-contextual on some level), debaters can (as Michael observes) have impact framework debates and so not resort to a simple “look at this standard before this one and so exclude all her impacts.” Maybe we get to the same place, but my point is that it doesn’t require a shift in the way the resolution is understood to frame the debate.
Michael points out that other debate events handle the problem I’ve just described by doing impact framework debate only when necessary. To some extent that also happens in LD in that debaters can agree on standard / impact framework under which to proceed, but I understand his point to be that it needn’t happen preemptively in ever round.
I think that is true, but it seems then to be a matter of preference. I like to see standards level debate that is quite fleshed out (again, not necessarily value and criterion but generically a normative paradigm under which to evaluate impacts). I like that for several reasons:
a. It gets at the kinds of theoretical issues that just interest me…
b. It does give students access to some important academic debates that are going on - its not just a mental exercise…
c. Most importantly: Often important/debatable issues in the “real world” suffer, I think, from underdevelopment on this basic “what constitutes justice” level. A sort of theory/practice dichotomy pervades a lot of public policy discourse that leads us off course or closes off important avenues of criticism and discussion. We frequently go astray by virtue of the fact that we haven’t thought deeply enough about our basic assumptions about right/wrong/just/unjust whatever the normative framework is.
Most “family values” issues take this form, for example. To argue against someone who believes, for example, that enemy combatants are not due the same protection as US citizens, or that gay Americans should not be allowed to marry, or that black Americans shouldn’t be allowed to vote, we have to be able to question the basis of what people are due at a very fundamental level. No appeal to observable, material fact rebuts a claim like “our values come from God and God says homosexuality is immoral.”* So, I think it is both valuable and intellectually rigorous to place emphasis on comparing and arguing about impact framework / standards debates in every round.
This is not to say that we oughtn’t be able to do good impacts debate within a particular normative structure, but I think something is lost if we don’t pay enough attention to developing a normative paradigm under which to operate.
All that is by way of articulating a preference, though. I guess I think that the ability to delve deeply into policy considerations on an assumed cost/benefit paradigm is provided by other events, but at the same time I don’t think there is any reason why we shouldn’t be able to explore both impact level and standards level issues within the LD forum.
*This is just an example. I’m not saying that religious views necessarily claim that homosexuality is immoral (many of course do not). I simply use it as an example of the type of argument its hard to rebut without serious engagement with particular normative paradigms of the kind that is developed when we do standards debate.
Posted from: 76.17.236.195
April 3rd, 2008 11:23
p.s. - Adam - btw, a good debate coach would check VBD every few hours regardless of whether he was on vacation : ). Just kidding of course.
p.p.s - This discussion has taken a very similar trajectory to one of the late night VBI discussions with Adam and Ryan in which I was fortunate enough to participate. I feel like we should be grading literacy quizzes while having this discussion : ).
Posted from: 128.54.165.135
April 3rd, 2008 12:14
I don’t see why we wouldn’t be able to use VCs…. they seem to allow for more diverse cases and criticisms… I mean, the implicit standard in all policy rounds is net=benefits… I think that making the criterion or standard explicit LD has a 1up on policy. It actually allows debaters to conceptualize the round in a more coherent manner as opossed to having scattered criterion debates.
It just makes more sense to default to net-benefits if no standard is given (that’s what I do if the standards debate is non-existent…). If a standard is given then use that for evaluating the round.
This approach wouldn’t really change the structure of LD too much in terms of the normal args on each topic. To my understanding, it would get rid of the typical a priori arg and the notion that the aff has to prove the resolution true. What becomes the determining factor in the round, that is the highest impact, would be the value and any standards under it. If someone wanted to run a K then they would just have to posit their own VC or, for that matter, posit their own value and see which one is better. This would actually make the focus on values debate and making not only topical impacts, but impacts that have to be weighed…
if im wrong on this then somebody should correct me here, but thats the kind fo debate i’d like to see. Values and Crtierions are really important to talk about because they are inherent claims to any argument and are an important tool to analyzing the claims that institutions of power make.
Posted from: 68.227.29.120
April 3rd, 2008 12:42
“So what happens if we say all arguments need to be contextual…. We are forced to appeal to a standard of preferability and problem starts. In the alternative, we have an appeal to some sort of costs and benefits standard that is assumed prior to the round - that is the underdeveloped CBA I’m worried about. We either develop the impact framework debate and get infinite regress (and ultimately the same problem that non-contextualized standards have) or we don’t develop it and get a less substantial assumed costs/benefits calculus.”
I suppose I see that as a false dichotomy. My argument is that we should be comparative, not that we should avoid engaging in the sort of framework issues that are critical to effective moral reasoning. Sure, any debate that focuses on a comparison between teleological and deontological harms will become decontextualized to a large extent; there are a lot of important issues that need to be addressed before we can engage in the actual comparison of the two implications. But, in the status quo, only one half of that debate happens: we resolve whether we use a deontological or teleological framework and then exclude arguments whose impacts aren’t relevant under that structure. The alternative would allow discussion of another issue to arise: even if deontological considerations normally trump teleological harms, is there a point at which the teleological impacts are so great that they outweigh relatively “minor” violations of deontological side-constraints?
That’s why I think, ultimately, the benefits of the status quo which have been described are ultimately non-unique. We can have the same discussions we have now under the alternative. Indeed, I would argue the alternative provides for even more of those benefits: it allows students to debate a greater range of issues and ultimately allows for an even more nuanced understanding and discussion of our underlying assumptions.
Don’t let some of the rhetoric draw focus from the underlying crux of the argument. The advocacy is not that rounds should be decided on the basis cost-benefit analysis. The alternative instead forces debaters to more directly, and substantively, engage their opponents’ arguments, by forcing them to be comparative. The content of that comparison, the depth of the analysis supporting it, and the “rules” regarding how the judge should resolve that debate are still ultimately left to the debaters.
I really don’t think there’s much disagreement about what those of us who have posted so far see as “good debate.” I think, in large part, we are just using different words to describe the same concepts. It seems to me the only real disagreement is about the form those arguments should take. I suppose, at that level, my only real response is to look to the status quo. The kinds of arguments and debates we appear to agree we’d like to see aren’t happening now, in a world in which we use arbitrary structures called a “value” and “criterion.” Given that, isn’t time we tried something else? More importantly, I think both Michael and I have given persuasive arguments as to why the alternative we describe would (pardon the debate jargon) capture all the advantages of the status quo while also providing additional net-benefits.
On a relatively unrelated note, I had an e-mail conversation with Earl St. Sauver from South Eugene about the alternative, and some other potential concerns with the model. Would there be any interest in me posting that conversation? Earl has already given his permission for me to do so.
Posted from: 68.227.29.120
April 3rd, 2008 12:58
Eh. I’ve got a few minutes before I head off for lunch, so here’s the conversation anyway, whether you like it or not. You probably want to start reading from the bottom (if you do choose to read), as that’s where you’ll find Earl’s original e-mail.
On Mon, Mar 24, 2008 at 1:16 PM, AdamN wrote:
Earl,
1. I guess my confusion stems from how I view the example you pose. I don’t see that as preclusion. I see it as weighing. If you win two reasons why your impact is more important, you win. But your opponent could obviously contest those claims. I suppose the difference is that, in the status quo, that debate is utterly decontextualized: we debate which impacts matter and then preclude all impacts that don’t meet that standard. In worldview comparison, however, you have to engage each impact on the flow in a very contextualized way. So even if, generally, inherent impacts outweigh because of the comparatively greater probability, the magnitude of a particular harm may comparatively be so much larger that it becomes more important than one which is inherent. The action paralysis issue is different, but I think it functions in the same way. Generally, it may be bad to prevent action because of an infinitesimally small risk of nuclear war, but the risk may be large enough for a specific advocacy that it really should keep up from acting. Ultimately, though, the arguments are not preclusive in the same way they are in the status quo. With a standard, the debate I’ve just described never happens, because the arguments that fail to link would be utterly precluded. With worldview comparison, at least the debate happens, even if the outcome is generally the same. To use debate jargon: even if the plan has a solvency deficit, there is still a net benefit from the increased education that results.
4. That’s why I think it’s important for judges to update their paradigm for each topic by indicating which side they think is more likely to represent the status quo. That way, even if the presumption debate goes unresolved in round, there is still a predictable evaluative mechanism left at the end of the round.
5. I’m actually going to update my paradigm once the article in published. Long story short, I’m leaning towards using worldview comparison to evaluate the round only if either both debaters agree or one debater wins arguments for using that paradigm in round. Otherwise, I’ll be just as tab as a usually am. So, while I wouldn’t like voting for negating presumption on the basis of some truth-value justification, such as we assume falsity, and would probably not be very kind in awarding speaks, I would vote that way if the argument won on the flow.
- Adam
On 3/24/08 12:30 PM, “Earl St Sauver” wrote:
Hey adam,
By the way I’m not sure I mentioned it, but I feel like this paradigm is danm near how I will evaluate rounds and my issues are literally just with a couple of the implications, not the basic evaluatory mechanism. This is an awesome contribution to debate theory…*cough* theory hack *cough* :)
1. So it seems to me though that there is some tension within the worldview comparison model of what are theoretically legitimate strategies and what aren’t. The example I gave had two warrants for why the affirmative’s intrinsic arguments should be the only things evaluated, probability and action paralyzing. The issues has nothing to do with being a means to an end, but rather deals with how the judge should evaluate impacts and would fall under the “debate […] about which impacts matter more.” But these would function the same way. So it seems the tension exists in trying to solve preclusionary arguments and also allowing weighing between arguments. As far as I’ve seen it the preclusionary standard has always functioned as saying these arguments have no impact/these other arguments have an infinite impact etc.
4. I think an issue with status quo presumption that will have to be resolved is what the judge feels is a status quo value framework. In the current debate world, if I have some really awesome 100% defense I can extend as the negative, I know I can pick up most circuit judge’s ballots on presumption if I’m negative, even though they might not want to vote on presumption. In the status quo presumption paradigm, it could vary likely be unclear to the debaters which way the judge will default. AKA, the affirmative says torture good, there’s no offense at the end of the round. If ryan hamilton’s in the back we can be pretty sure which way the ballot will go, but it may be unclear with many judges.
If nothing else, this feels scarily close to making the judge vote how they feel. Voting every time there is no offense a certain way (regardless of how they vote) seems to avoid a intervention that would be required.
5. Less a question about the article but more about your personal decision calculus.
If I’m debating in front of you and make a presumption argument (aka, presume negative because there are more ways things can be false then they can be true or some other generic presumption variant) would that overturn the default paradigm because it’s a theory argument about how your paradigm would be shaped or would it stay the same.
Also, in rounds where this paradigm isn’t used by either debaters do you just default to tab or do you graft the round into this paradigm.
On Mon, Mar 24, 2008 at 11:09 AM, AdamN wrote:
Hey Earl,
1. Yes. The paradigm intervenes against intrinsically theoretically illegitimate strategies. They’re bad for debate, and I have no problem advocating a world in which they are irrelevant to the judge’s decision calculus. Yes, it is bad to use people as means to an end. But, as far as I’ve been able to tell, it’s inevitable that will happen. So, using the current resolution as an example, that affirming leads to using people as means to an end is terminally non-unique and is not a reason to negate.
But, that said, I’m not sure the example you’re using makes sense given the paradigm as I’ve described it. I think you’re posing a false dichotomy. Under worldview comparison, a debate would have to occur about which impacts matter more. Then, the debater who wins that debate would win the round. If that debate is unresolved at the end of the round, the judge would have to rely on intervention/presumption in order to sign the ballot, but that’s true of the status quo. If neither debater is winning the standards debate, and neither debater is effectively weighing the offense that is being generated, there’s no way for the judge to vote but on intervention, and it sounds to me like that’s the world you’re describing. Does that make sense? Basically, I’m advocating a world in which a debate would have to occur about how to compare those impacts. If neither side wins that debate, that really sucks for both the judge and the debaters, but that’s something that happens all the time now. And I think it would happen less under worldview comparison.
4. That would depend on the advocacies adopted by the debaters. The affirmative might advocate a specific implementation of that resolution. And that implementation could either be something that happens now or something that would require change from the status quo. Either way, there is always a status quo to evaluate. I can think of arguments saying both that we sacrifice innocents to save others now and that we don’t. The beauty of status quo presumption is that it allows that debate to occur, based on the strategic choices made by the debaters, rather than arbitrarily assigning one side as the one that always wins in the event of a tie.
- Adam
On 3/24/08 10:51 AM, “Earl St Sauver” wrote:
Hey Adam,
Thanks for CC’ing Wesley, we’re actually planning to have a major discussion on your theory article at some point and this makes a great start.
I did still have a couple questions though.
So the issue I see that still stands is that the preclusionary aspects of standards analysis would still either A) Logically apply here or B) This paradigm would have to intervene. I’ll give an example scenarios to elaborate the issue. The affirmative case argues that the resolution inherently prevents 100,000 deaths and we should only evaluate the intrinsic harms of an action because they have a 100% probability of happening and evaluating minuscule risks of nuclear war paralyzes us into inaction. The negative stands up and reads a politics disad with 70 links and a terminal impact of war/extinction/the sun (or all of the universe’s suns) blow up/wesley get’s a real job. (I have nothing against politics, just using it as an illustration) So if all of these arguments are won at the round, it seems that the new paradigm would face a dilemma. Either A) The judge doesn’t evaluate the negative’s claims of nuclear war because they’re precluded because they’re not intrinsic or B) The judge says we have to evaluate the impacts of less imminent things. If we don’t evaluate non-intrinsic things then the paradigm hasn’t solved the preclusion wars issues, and if we do evaluate them then a judge will blatantly have to intervene.
Cool, I agree now.
Also agreeing now.
New Question:How would the presumption for status quo resolve something like “It is just to kill one innocent to save the lives of other innocents” since there would be no status quo to evaluate.
On Sun, Mar 23, 2008 at 6:01 PM, AdamN wrote:
Hey Earl,
I hope you don’t mind, but I’ve cc’ed Wes so that he can see my thoughts on these issues.
The paradigm is inherently comparative. Accordingly, purely deontological frameworks are theoretically incoherent. A debater cannot be advocating a comparatively preferable worldview if their sole indict of the opposing worldview is that it features some deontological harm that is utterly unavoidable. The impact is terminally non-unique.
I wouldn’t say it adds another standard. Instead, it modifies one already in place. There are rounds in which the agreed-upon framework absolutely fails to allow for evaluation of the round. To put it bluntly: If you can’t generate offense, or any reason to prefer your advocacy, under the agreed-upon framework, the judge needs some other mechanism by which to evaluate the round. Status quo presumption at least allows debaters to engage the issue of what the judge should do in those circumstances. It actively encourages the debaters to consider that issue and debate the extent to which they represent the status quo, to the extent they see that issue as strategically valuable.
I’m not sure that’s an accurate interpretation of my advocacy. In the world I defend, debaters agree to evaluate the round on the basis of whose worldview is most desirable. They then choose how they would like to interpret the worldview attributable to their side (either affirmative or negative). If neither side generates offense, then, the status quo would inherently be more desirable, as change from the status quo requires spending both time and resources, costs that, because of the lack of offensive reasons for change, lack benefits to outweigh those costs. Thus, status quo presumption respects both the framework the debaters have agreed to and the advocacies they have chosen within that framework. Intervening in the way you describe, and voting for the debater whom the judge feels would have more offense to the standard, would be far more interventionist, as it would require ignoring how the agreed-upon framework must necessarily function. In a comparison of worldviews, the status quo is always more desirable, absent advantages to changing that status quo which outweigh the costs.
Does that answer your questions? Just let me know if there’s anything you’d like to discuss further.
- Adam
On 3/23/08 5:40 PM, “Earl St Sauver” wrote:
Yes, I had three specific questions about some of the implications of the new LD paradigm.
1. Why do the preclusionary effects of a standard go away? If a debater used a deontological framework and said that is all that is desirable to evaluate/ that we should only evaluate impacts in terms of the means, wouldn’t that still make the ends irrelevant as a preemptive impact comparison/weighing?
2. Isn’t a status Quo presumption just essentially adding another standard that the debater’s haven’t agreed on that functions after whatever weighing analysis/standards they have already agreed to?
3. Why is it acceptable for a judge to intervene to weigh to see what is closer to the status quo when it isn’t okay to intervene to see who comes closer to garnering offense to an agreed upon impact or standard? Aka, if two debaters agree to a framework for evaluating the round (to keep it simple let’s call it body count) but then neither are winning offense to it, it seems to me that as a judge it would require less work to presume for who you feel would result in less deaths because then the judge would be using an agreed upon framework.
Posted from: 71.42.73.162
April 3rd, 2008 17:55
for the sake of mentioning it, i am working on a response to this article. i do believe that ld resolutions are declarative statements, and it might be a little bit until i post those reasons why because that idea has come under very heavy scrutiny, and as such, i feel like it requires a very thorough defense. the point is just that i hope that people continue to pay attention to this thread.
Posted from: 71.236.67.195
April 3rd, 2008 18:33
totally off-topic but relevant to this thriving discussion:
the comments system is inelegant and the vbd built-in forum is simplistic and creepy (seriously, it keeps track of how many times you log in, what IPs you use, etc and then displays them publicly). since theldboards has been down for months, i set up a forum at debate.michael-mangus.com/forum/. see this post for rationale: http://debate.michael-mangus.com/forum/index.php?topic=4.0
Posted from: 169.226.70.133
April 4th, 2008 10:31
I think the uniqueness comes from specifically asking a judge to make judgment on “desirability” In my estimation it is much easier to set aside ones biases if the means of evaluation is clear cut: The Aff either extended offense through some kind of standard, or they did not, as opposed to a paradigm which asks them to look at the round holistically and say which side has provided a more desirable advocacy.
To me, that seems intuitive, but you’re free to disagree.
Posted from: 68.227.29.120
April 4th, 2008 13:16
Shea:
I suppose my confusion results from my perception that the two models do not differ at all in that regard. That is, both approaches have equally clear cut means of evaluation. The status quo compares impacts to a standard. The alternative merely compares those impacts in a more holistic way. Either way, it is the responsibility of debaters to be extending and comparing impacts, ultimately explaining to the judge how those impacts should be evaluated vis a vis the ballot. Either way, the debater who wins under the framework established for the round earns the ballot.
Does that answer your concern? If not, could you perhaps more thoroughly explain the difference you see leading to a greater likelihood, and/or degree, of intervention?
Posted from: 71.42.73.162
April 15th, 2008 01:16
so scratch that - both eric palmer and i are each working on responses and they should both be available tomorrow.
the biggest concern for me here is that i just don’t think i’m okay with a paradigm that justifies us lying to ourselves.
here’s what i mean; a conversation which permitted debate under this paradigm could quite conceivably go like this.
“it is just for the united states to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that pose a military threat.”
“there’s no way that could be the case; in an ethically empty international arena where states function amorally and where norms cannot rule, we can’t possibly say that such claims are true.”
“yeah, i know, but it would be really awesome if we just ACTED like it was true.”
to me, this paradigm seems to collapse into admitting that it’s okay to fool ourselves instead of rethinking our suppositions when they’re challenged. more on that later, though.
Posted from: 24.6.237.64
April 15th, 2008 03:47
michael,
my off-the-cuff reply to your objection is something like: yes, you need to win a terminal impact to self-deception. intuitively, it seems like that should be pretty easy to do - if you can’t, you probably have larger worries than which model of debate the judge is employing. =P
ultimately, it seems reasonable to allow the debaters to weigh out the negative consequences of fooling ourselves and the positive consequences of this particular delusion. at the very least, that seems far more reasonable than the alternative that truth-seeking would provide of arbitrarily preferring one set of impacts over another. i’m sure your more in-depth formulation of this objection already accounted for this potential reply, but it’s something to ponder nonetheless…
Posted from: 71.42.73.162
April 15th, 2008 08:43
also related to this discussion, please, everyone, visit http://ldtheoryjournal.blogspot.com
Posted from: 206.251.74.247
April 15th, 2008 09:27
[…] director of debate at the Harker School in California — published an article entitled “Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate.” That article generated some discussion here on VBD and elsewhere. Today, Eric Palmer […]
Posted from: 38.118.23.100
April 16th, 2008 16:03
kamil is a beast